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    WordPress Plugin Safety Check

    1

    A register_rest_route() with DELETE and no permission_callback is open to the whole internet, and "WHERE id = " .

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    WordPress Plugin Safety Check

    WordPress Plugin Safety Check

    Example session with this skill installed

    Check this project with wordpress-plugin-safety-check.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the wordpress plugin safety

    $ python3 scripts/check_wp_plugin.py examples/risky
    BLOCK order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:26 W01 SQL_WITH_REQUEST_DATA
    $rows = $wpdb->get_results( "SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}order_desk WHERE status = '$status'" );
    Why: A $wpdb query (query, get_results, get_row, get_var, get_col, or the query string given to prepare) is built with request data ($_GET, $_POST, $_REQUEST, $_COOKIE, request headers) that was not turned into a number or passed as a prepare() placeholder. sanitize_text_field() and wp_unslash() do not make a value safe for SQL, so anyone who can send the request can read or change the database (SQL injection).
    Safer: Pass every value as a $wpdb->prepare() placeholder: $wpdb->get_row( $wpdb->prepare( "SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}orders WHERE id = %d", $id ) ). Cast IDs with absint() and check ORDER BY columns and table names against an allow list (or use %i on WordPress 6.2 and later).

    BLOCK order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:28 W04 REQUEST_DATA_ECHOED
    BLOCK order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:30 W05 REQUEST_DATA_IN_DANGEROUS_CALL
    BLOCK order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:37 W06 OPTION_OR_META_NAME_FROM_REQUEST
    BLOCK order-desk/order-desk.php:16 W03 STATE_CHANGE_WITHOUT_NONCE
    BLOCK order-desk/order-desk.php:27 W02 REST_WRITE_ROUTE_WITHOUT_PERMISSION_CALLBACK
    REVIEW order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:27 W15 SQL_NOT_PREPARED
    REVIEW order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:29 W14 OUTPUT_NOT_ESCAPED
    REVIEW order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:37 W13 SETTING_SAVED_UNSANITIZED
    REVIEW order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:42 W11 MISSING_CAPABILITY_CHECK
    REVIEW order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:45 W16 FILE_PATH_OR_UPLOAD_FROM_REQUEST
    REVIEW order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:56 W16 FILE_PATH_OR_UPLOAD_FROM_REQUEST
    REVIEW order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:63 W15 SQL_NOT_PREPARED
    REVIEW order-desk/order-desk.php:14 W18 NO_DIRECT_ACCESS_GUARD
    REVIEW order-desk/order-desk.php:21 W13 SETTING_SAVED_UNSANITIZED
    REVIEW order-desk/order-desk.php:31 W12 REST_ROUTE_OPEN_TO_EVERYONE
    REVIEW order-desk/order-desk.php:40 W17 TLS_VERIFY_OFF
    REVIEW order-desk/readme.txt:5 W19 README_HEADER_PROBLEM
    REVIEW order-desk/readme.txt:7 W19 README_HEADER_PROBLEM

    (Each finding also has Why and Safer lines, as in the first one.)
    Verdict: BLOCK. Checked 3 files, 3 with WordPress plugin or theme content.
    This is a static check of file text. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    One wp_ajax_ handler that saves settings without check_ajax_referer() lets another site make a logged-in admin change them, and any subscriber can call it when current_user_can() is missing. A register_rest_route() with DELETE and no permission_callback is open to the whole internet, and "WHERE id = " . $_GET['id'] in a $wpdb query is SQL injection even after sanitize_text_field(). These are the mistakes behind most plugin security advisories. This skill finds them and the other WordPress plugin mistakes below before you release or submit to WordPress.org, and tells you how to fix each one.

    Your agent runs a scanner on the plugin or theme folder: every .php file and the plugin readme.txt. It follows request data ($_GET, $_POST, $_REQUEST, $_COOKIE, $_FILES, request headers, filter_input(), REST request parameters) through assignments, foreach loops, ternaries, wp_unslash() and string building inside each function, and knows which WordPress functions sanitize (sanitize_text_field, absint, sanitize_key), escape (esc_html, esc_attr, esc_url, wp_kses_post) or prepare ($wpdb->prepare placeholders) a value. It matches add_action() hooks, admin pages and REST routes to their handlers by name across all files, including the plugin boilerplate's hook loader and nonce or permission helpers the handler calls. The examples from the plugin handbook (AJAX with check_ajax_referer, the settings page, REST endpoints with __return_true on GET routes, the REST controller) are not reported as BLOCK. It never runs PHP or WordPress. It returns BLOCK, REVIEW, or NOT FLAGGED, with the file, line, reason, and a safer approach. Secrets in shown lines are never printed.

    What it checks

    BLOCK

    • W01: $wpdb queries (query, get_results, get_row, get_var, get_col, or the query string given to prepare) built with request data that was not cast to a number or passed as a placeholder
    • W02: REST routes with POST, PUT, PATCH or DELETE methods and no permission_callback (when the callback checks current_user_can() itself, it is W12)
    • W03: wp_ajax_, admin_post_, admin page and admin_init handlers that change data because of the request without a nonce check, including wp_verify_nonce() results that are ignored and checks that only run when that nonce field is present (handlers also registered for wp_ajax_nopriv_ are public by design and left to W11)
    • W04: request data printed with echo, print, short echo tags, printf, _e or wp_die without escaping, including $_SERVER['PHP_SELF'], REQUEST_URI and request headers
    • W05: request data in unserialize(), maybe_unserialize(), extract(), include or require, eval(), call_user_func(), a variable function name, or a shell command
    • W06: option names and user meta keys taken from the request (update_option, delete_option, update_user_meta and similar), or a whole $_POST array given to wp_update_user()

    REVIEW

    • W11: handlers that change data without current_user_can() (wp_ajax_ and admin_post_ for any logged-in user; wp_ajax_nopriv_, admin_init and init for settings, users, plugins and files), including is_admin() used as a permission check
    • W12: GET routes without permission_callback, write routes whose permission_callback is __return_true, always returns true, or is is_user_logged_in, and write routes without one whose callback checks current_user_can() itself
    • W13: request data saved with update_option, update_post_meta, update_user_meta or set_theme_mod without a sanitizing function, and register_setting() without a sanitize_callback
    • W14: unescaped output of get_option, get_post_meta, get_user_meta, get_theme_mod, get_transient, add_query_arg(), remove_query_arg(), get_query_var(), REST parameters, and request data that was only sanitized
    • W15: $wpdb queries joined together from REST parameters or from esc_sql()/esc_like() escaped request data instead of prepare()
    • W16: file calls (unlink, readfile, file_get_contents, fopen, file_put_contents, copy, rename, $wp_filesystem) with paths from the request, move_uploaded_file() with no file type check, and wp_handle_upload() with 'test_type' => false
    • W17: TLS checks turned off: 'sslverify' => false, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER or CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST off, 'verify_peer' => false, the https_ssl_verify filter returning false (loopback requests to the site itself are not reported)
    • W18: plugin PHP files that run code before any ABSPATH check, and uninstall.php without a WP_UNINSTALL_PLUGIN check (guards such as if ( ! defined( 'ABSPATH' ) ) { header( ... ); exit; } and Akismet's ! function_exists( 'add_action' ) check count)
    • W19: readme.txt header problems: no === Plugin Name === line, missing Contributors, Tested up to, Stable tag or License, Stable tag: trunk, a Stable tag that differs from Version in the main plugin file, Tested up to older than the last three major WordPress releases, more than 5 tags, a short description over 150 characters, the template's default text

    What's included

    • The scanner (Python 3.9+, standard library only)
    • A rules guide with the reason, safer approach and official WordPress or PHP source for each rule
    • A risky and a safe example plugin (main file, AJAX and REST handlers, readme.txt), and the real report the scanner produces on the risky one

    Limits It reads each file as written. Request data is followed inside one function; values passed between functions, stored in class properties by another method, or passed through filters are not followed, and output of functions it does not know counts as safe. Hooks with names or callbacks built at run time, and nonce or capability checks more than one call away from the handler, are not seen. JavaScript, block.json, vendor and tests folders are not read. Files that only define classes or functions are not asked for an ABSPATH guard (Plugin Check is stricter there), and theme files are not checked for it. Tested up to is compared with a dated cut-off: 6.9, the oldest of the last three major releases in November 2026. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    Static check of PHP and readme.txt text. Data passed between functions or through filters, hooks built at run time, checks more than one call deep, JavaScript and block.json are not followed or read. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

      Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.

    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before any payment.

    Reviews

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    Security scanned

    Checked by our 8-point scan before listing

    Fresh listing

    Recently published to Agensi

    Money-back guarantee

    Doesn't do what its page promises? You get your money back.

    Trust & safety

    Security scan

    Security scan passed 4 days ago

    Permissions

    Terminal / Shell
    Read Files

    Runs one local Python script in the terminal. It reads your project's files, writes nothing, and makes no network calls. The example plugin contains deliberately unsafe PHP for the scanner to find; it is never run and holds no real keys or tokens.

    Listed4 days ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    No. The script reads local files only and makes no network calls.

    No. It only reports. Your agent changes files only if you ask it to.

    Any agent that supports SKILL.md skills and can run a terminal command, such as Claude Code. It needs Python 3.9 or newer and nothing else.

    No. It reads the plugin's PHP files and readme.txt as text. It never runs PHP, never loads WordPress and never contacts WordPress.org.

    BLOCK: fix it before you ship. REVIEW: check it before release. NOT FLAGGED: no rule matched. It is a static check, so NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    The scanner, a rules guide with the reason and safer approach for every rule, a risky and a safe example WordPress plugin, and the real report the scanner prints on the risky example.

    New in Security