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    Vault Config and Policy Check

    1

    It returns BLOCK, REVIEW, or NOT FLAGGED, with the file, line, reason, and a safer approach.

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    Vault Config and Policy Check

    Vault Config and Policy Check

    Example session with this skill installed

    Check this project with vault-config-policy-check.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the vault config

    $ python3 scripts/check_vault.py examples/risky
    BLOCK deploy/vault.env:2 V04 VAULT_TOKEN_OR_KEY_IN_FILE
    VAULT_TOKEN=<redacted>
    Why: A Vault token (hvs., hvb., hvr. or the older s., b., r. formats), an unseal or recovery key, saved vault operator init output (Unseal Key 1:, Initial Root Token:, unseal_keys_b64, root_token), a literal VAULT_TOKEN, a token in a Terraform provider or GitHub Action, a password or secret_id typed after vault login or vault write auth/..., or a credential in a server or agent stanza (a seal token, cloud secret key or HSM pin, a storage token or password, a password in a connection URL) is written in the file. Anyone who can read the repository, image or CI log can unseal Vault or act with that token's policies.
    Safer: Revoke the token and rotate the key or credential now (vault operator rekey for unseal keys). Pass tokens through the CI secret store, the environment, token_file or auto_auth, use env:// or file:// references for seal and storage credentials, and keep init output with the key holders, not in the repository.

    BLOCK deploy/vault.service:7 V02 DEV_SERVER_IN_DEPLOYMENT
    BLOCK ops/vault-init.txt:1 V04 VAULT_TOKEN_OR_KEY_IN_FILE
    BLOCK ops/vault-init.txt:2 V04 VAULT_TOKEN_OR_KEY_IN_FILE
    BLOCK ops/vault-init.txt:3 V04 VAULT_TOKEN_OR_KEY_IN_FILE
    BLOCK ops/vault-init.txt:5 V04 VAULT_TOKEN_OR_KEY_IN_FILE
    BLOCK vault/config/vault.hcl:11 V04 VAULT_TOKEN_OR_KEY_IN_FILE
    BLOCK vault/config/vault.hcl:17 V01 TLS_OFF_ON_NETWORK_LISTENER
    BLOCK vault/config/vault.hcl:33 V04 VAULT_TOKEN_OR_KEY_IN_FILE
    BLOCK vault/policies/break-glass.hcl:2 V03 POLICY_GRANTS_EVERY_PATH
    REVIEW deploy/vault.env:1 V12 PLAIN_HTTP_OR_TLS_NOT_VERIFIED
    REVIEW docker-compose.yml:3 V18 UNMAINTAINED_OR_UNPINNED_IMAGE
    REVIEW docker-compose.yml:16 V19 DEV_ONLY_SETTING
    REVIEW vault/agent/agent.hcl:2 V12 PLAIN_HTTP_OR_TLS_NOT_VERIFIED
    REVIEW vault/agent/agent.hcl:3 V12 PLAIN_HTTP_OR_TLS_NOT_VERIFIED
    REVIEW vault/config/vault.hcl:5 V11 MLOCK_OFF_WITHOUT_RAFT
    REVIEW vault/config/vault.hcl:6 V16 UNAUTHENTICATED_OR_RAW_ENDPOINT
    REVIEW vault/config/vault.hcl:24 V15 OLD_TLS_VERSION
    REVIEW vault/config/vault.hcl:27 V16 UNAUTHENTICATED_OR_RAW_ENDPOINT
    REVIEW vault/policies/payments-app.hcl:2 V13 BROAD_WILDCARD_GRANT
    REVIEW vault/policies/payments-app.hcl:7 V14 SYS_OR_ESCALATION_PATH
    REVIEW vault/policies/payments-app.hcl:12 V17 CONFIG_VAULT_REJECTS
    REVIEW vault/raft/vault.hcl:2 V17 CONFIG_VAULT_REJECTS
    REVIEW vault/raft/vault.hcl:5 V17 CONFIG_VAULT_REJECTS

    (Each finding also has Why and Safer lines, as in the first one.)
    Verdict: BLOCK. Checked 9 files, 9 with Vault content.
    This is a static check of file text. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    REVIEW docker-compose.yml

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    A listener with tls_disable = 1 on 0.0.0.0 sends every token and secret over plain HTTP, a "break-glass" policy with path "*" and sudo is the root policy under another name, and a saved vault-init.txt hands anyone with the repository your unseal keys and root token. This skill finds those and the other Vault mistakes below before you deploy, and tells you how to fix each one.

    Your agent runs a scanner on Vault server, Agent and Proxy configs (HCL and JSON, also inside vault-helm values, ConfigMaps and VAULT_LOCAL_CONFIG), ACL policies (HCL, JSON, Terraform vault_policy heredocs, vault_policy_document rules, vault policy write heredocs in scripts and CI), and the files that run or reach Vault: docker-compose, Kubernetes manifests and injector annotations, vault-helm values, systemd units, Dockerfiles, Nomad jobs, .env files, shell scripts, GitHub Actions with vault-action and saved vault operator init output. It reads HCL with a line number for every key (also blocks written on one line), knows Vault's defaults (a listener without an address binds 127.0.0.1), policy path matching with + and *, the legacy policy = "write" syntax and env:// and file:// references, and never contacts Vault or runs anything. It returns BLOCK, REVIEW, or NOT FLAGGED, with the file, line, reason, and a safer approach. Secrets are never printed.

    What it checks

    BLOCK

    • V01: a tcp listener with tls_disable on while it listens beyond loopback (0.0.0.0, [::], a host name, a private IP), in a deployment config (in a local compose file, docker run script or dev/test path it is V19 instead)
    • V02: a dev server (vault server -dev, the hashicorp/vault image with no command, server.dev.enabled) in a systemd unit, Kubernetes workload, Helm values, Nomad job or a production-named compose file or Dockerfile; production words in the path win over local ones
    • V03: a policy path that matches every path (* or +/*) with sudo or a write capability
    • V04: Vault tokens (hvs., hvb., hvr. and the older s., b., r.), unseal and recovery keys, saved init output, literal VAULT_TOKEN values, passwords typed after vault login, and seal or storage credentials written in a config (placeholders and the dev root token are not reported; .env.example files only for real token formats)

    REVIEW

    • V11: disable_mlock = true with a storage backend other than integrated storage (check that swap is off or encrypted)
    • V12: plain http:// to Vault on another host, or certificate checks turned off (tls_skip_verify, VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY, skip_tls_verify, tlsSkipVerify, the tls-skip-verify annotation)
    • V13: write or sudo on a wildcard that covers a whole mount (secret/, kv/data/, auth/*), or read on every path
    • V14: grants that raise privileges: most of sys/, writing any ACL policy (also scoped ones like app-*), sys/raw, audit devices, auth mounts, generate-root, rekey, seal, the plugin catalog, sudo on auth/token/create, writing identity entities and groups
    • V15: tls_min_version or tls_max_version set to tls10 or tls11
    • V16: raw_storage_endpoint, enable_unauthenticated_access, or unauthenticated metrics or pprof on a non-loopback listener
    • V17: settings Vault rejects or ignores: unknown capabilities such as write, unknown path keys, arguments set twice (Vault 2.1), a * before the end of a path, integrated storage without disable_mlock (Vault 1.20), a TLS listener without a certificate
    • V18: the old Docker official vault image (last release 1.13.3) or hashicorp/vault with no tag or latest
    • V19: dev-only settings in a local setup: TLS off on all interfaces in a compose file or dev/test path, or the dev root token used while VAULT_ADDR points at another machine

    What's included

    • The scanner (Python 3.9+, standard library only)
    • A rules guide with the reason, safer approach and official HashiCorp documentation link for each rule
    • A risky and a safe example project (server and raft configs, policies, an Agent config, a systemd unit, an env file, a compose file and saved init output), and the real report the scanner produces on the risky one

    Limits It reads files as written. Audit devices, auth methods and the policies a token really receives live in Vault's storage and are not visible. Each policy path is judged on its own, templated paths are treated as fixed text, and Sentinel policies are not read. The vault-helm chart's default config runs without TLS on all interfaces, so V01 fires on it on purpose (the Docker Hub compose example gets V19); a service mesh that encrypts traffic is not visible. Whether a file is a deployment or a local setup is decided from the file type and the words in its path inside the repository. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    Static check of Vault configuration, policy and deployment file text. Vault's runtime state (audit devices, auth methods, token policies) and values set outside the files are not known. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

      Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.

    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before any payment.

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    Recently published to Agensi

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    Security scan

    Security scan passed 4 days ago

    Permissions

    Terminal / Shell
    Read Files

    Runs one local Python script in the terminal. It reads your project's files, writes nothing, and makes no network calls. The example project includes clearly fake, inert tokens and unseal keys (EXAMPLE, NOT-A-REAL-...) for the scanner to find. Nothing in it is run.

    Listed4 days ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    No. The script reads local files only and makes no network calls.

    No. It only reports. Your agent changes files only if you ask it to.

    Any agent that supports SKILL.md skills and can run a terminal command, such as Claude Code. It needs Python 3.9 or newer and nothing else.

    No. It reads Vault configs, policies and the files that start or reach Vault as text. It never calls Vault, never unseals anything, and tokens or keys it finds are masked.

    BLOCK: fix it before you ship. REVIEW: check it before release. NOT FLAGGED: no rule matched. It is a static check, so NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    The scanner, a rules guide with the reason and safer approach for every rule, a risky and a safe example Vault setup, and the real report the scanner prints on the risky example.

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