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    Threat Modeling

    1

    Map what could go wrong before you build it with evidence backed STRIDE threat modeling

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    Threat Modeling

    Threat Modeling

    Example session with this skill installed

    Threat model this new payments architecture before implementation. Users authenticate through OIDC. A public API creates payment intents. PostgreSQL stores tenant and transaction records. A webhook worker receives payment provider events. Object storage contains generated receipts. Build the system model, identify trust boundaries, apply STRIDE, prioritize the main threats, and show what should happen next.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the threat modeling

    System Model Evidence Gate

    The following architecture was supplied directly in the request.

    ComponentEvidence status
    OIDC authenticationUSER SUPPLIED
    Public payments APIUSER SUPPLIED
    PostgreSQL tenant and transaction storeUSER SUPPLIED
    Payment provider webhook workerUSER SUPPLIED
    Receipt object storageUSER SUPPLIED
    Specific cloud providerUNKNOWN / MISSING
    API gatewayUNKNOWN / MISSING
    Existing WAFUNKNOWN / MISSING
    Existing secrets managerUNKNOWN / MISSING

    No missing component is treated as an established architectural fact.

    System Model

    Assets

    • User identities and authenticated sessions
    • Tenant boundaries
    • Payment intent data
    • Transaction records
    • Payment provider webhook events
    • Generated receipts
    • Authorization state

    Actors

    • Authenticated application user
    • Payment provider
    • External unauthenticated client
    • Application services
    • Operations or administrative identities, if present

    Administrative identities are not described in the supplied architecture, so their exact capabilities remain UNKNOWN.

    Primary Trust Boundaries

    TB-01

    Internet client to public payments API.

    TB-02

    OIDC identity context to application authorization logic.

    TB-03

    Payment provider to webhook processing boundary.

    TB-04

    Application services to PostgreSQL.

    TB-05

    Application services to receipt object storage.

    Threat Register

    TM-01 Cross tenant payment access

    STRIDE

    Elevation of privilege / Information disclosure

    Scenario

    An authenticated user manipulates a payment or tenant scoped identifier and reaches another tenant's payment data.

    Evidence basis

    Tenant records and a public API are USER SUPPLIED.

    The exact authorization implementation is UNKNOWN.

    Priority

    HIGH, TENTATIVE

    Required response

    Define explicit tenant authorization requirements and negative cross tenant verification cases.

    Existing control

    UNVERIFIED

    Owner

    UNASSIGNED

    TM-02 Forged or replayed payment webhook

    STRIDE

    Spoofing / Tampering

    Scenario

    An attacker submits or replays a webhook event that the worker accepts as a legitimate payment provider message.

    Evidence basis

    The webhook worker and payment provider are USER SUPPLIED.

    The signature verification and replay protection mechanisms are UNKNOWN.

    Priority

    HIGH, TENTATIVE

    Required response

    Define authenticity, freshness, replay protection, and idempotency requirements for provider events.

    Existing control

    UNVERIFIED

    Owner

    UNASSIGNED

    TM-03 Receipt object exposure

    STRIDE

    Information disclosure

    Scenario

    Receipt objects become accessible across tenant boundaries or through overly broad object access.

    Evidence basis

    Receipt object storage is USER SUPPLIED.

    Bucket policy, object authorization, URL design, and retention controls are UNKNOWN.

    Priority

    HIGH, TENTATIVE

    Required response

    Define access control and data exposure requirements for receipt retrieval.

    Existing control

    UNVERIFIED

    Owner

    UNASSIGNED

    TM-04 Identity context substitution

    STRIDE

    Spoofing / Elevation of privilege

    Scenario

    Application authorization relies on identity or tenant attributes that can be substituted, confused, or trusted from an inappropriate source.

    Evidence basis

    OIDC authentication is USER SUPPLIED.

    Token validation rules and authorization claim handling are UNKNOWN.

    Priority

    HIGH, TENTATIVE

    Required response

    Define trusted identity sources, token validation requirements, and server side authorization boundaries.

    Existing control

    UNVERIFIED

    Owner

    UNASSIGNED

    Evidence Gaps

    The supplied architecture does not establish:

    • the cloud platform
    • network segmentation
    • administrative identity model
    • secret storage mechanism
    • existing rate limiting
    • API gateway behavior
    • webhook signature mechanism
    • object storage access policy
    • transaction encryption configuration
    • logging and monitoring controls

    These remain UNKNOWN rather than being assumed.

    Recommended Next Workflow

    Route the prioritized threats into security-requirements.

    Convert TM-01 through TM-04 into explicit security properties, acceptance criteria, and evidence expectations before implementation and focused verification begin.

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    Builds an evidence backed security model before implementation or active testing begins. It identifies assets, actors, data flows, trust boundaries, entry points, and abuse cases, then applies STRIDE to produce a prioritized threat register with explicit evidence status and response direction.

    What it does

    • Builds a structured system model from architecture and project evidence.
    • Identifies assets, actors, entry points, data flows, and trust boundaries.
    • Applies STRIDE across the modeled attack surface.
    • Records abuse cases and security consequences.
    • Prioritizes threats according to the available context.
    • Distinguishes verified architecture from user supplied, inferred, hypothetical, and missing information.
    • Prevents undocumented infrastructure from silently becoming fact.
    • Records unknown ownership and controls explicitly rather than inventing them.
    • Creates the foundation for security requirements, review, testing, and later release evidence.

    System Model Evidence Gate

    Every relevant component must be classified according to its evidence status:

    • VERIFIED
    • USER SUPPLIED
    • INFERRED
    • HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE
    • UNKNOWN / MISSING

    The workflow does not silently assume multi tenancy, OAuth, API gateways, databases, queues, cloud services, or other architecture that is not supported by the available evidence.

    When architecture evidence is insufficient, the result remains an evidence gap model or clearly identified reference model rather than presenting invented infrastructure as fact.

    How it works

    1. System scope identifies the product, feature, service, or architecture being modeled.
    2. Evidence classification records which architecture facts are established and which remain uncertain.
    3. Asset identification captures security sensitive data, identities, capabilities, and business operations.
    4. Actor mapping identifies trusted and untrusted principals.
    5. Data flow modeling traces how information crosses components and trust boundaries.
    6. Entry point analysis identifies externally or internally reachable surfaces.
    7. STRIDE analysis evaluates spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, and elevation of privilege where applicable.
    8. Abuse case analysis converts plausible attacker goals into concrete threat scenarios.
    9. Prioritization ranks threats while preserving uncertainty where evidence is incomplete.
    10. Handoff identifies required security requirements, reviews, testing, or architecture decisions.

    Evidence discipline

    A component that is not established by the supplied evidence is not promoted to a verified architectural fact.

    Existing controls are not assumed.

    Concrete owners are not invented.

    Threats that depend on uncertain architecture remain appropriately qualified.

    This keeps the threat model useful without creating false certainty.

    Boundaries

    Threat Modeling identifies what could go wrong and what security properties require attention.

    Testable acceptance criteria belong to security-requirements.

    Static implementation review belongs to the appropriate review specialist.

    Breadth first vulnerability discovery belongs to vulnerability-assessment.

    Exploitability proof belongs to exploit-validation.

    Authorized active intrusion testing belongs to the appropriate penetration testing specialist.

    Final security release assessment belongs to security-release-gate.

    This workflow does not exploit targets, modify application code, deploy changes, or claim that a modeled threat is a confirmed vulnerability.

    Why this beats prompting it yourself

    Generic threat modeling prompts often invent architecture to make the model look complete. That creates convincing but unreliable threats against systems that may not exist. This workflow treats architecture evidence as part of the security problem itself, preserving uncertainty while still producing actionable threat analysis.

    Validation

    Threat Modeling passed dedicated evidence hardening validation.

    The validation verified the System Model Evidence Gate, the five tier evidence taxonomy, explicit evidence gap handling, prohibition of silent assumptions about multi tenancy, OAuth, gateways, and storage, and explicit treatment of unknown owners and controls.

    At pack level, JetFerrari Security Engineering passed 58/58 routing integrity checks with zero unresolved cases.

    Use cases

    • Threat model a new application or service before implementation.
    • Review security implications of a proposed architecture.
    • Identify trust boundaries and high value assets.
    • Generate STRIDE based abuse cases.
    • Establish the security risks that should become formal requirements.
    • Identify missing architecture evidence before security testing begins.

    Known limitations

    The quality of the threat model depends on the architecture and project evidence available to the agent. Missing context can leave components, controls, ownership, and priorities uncertain. The workflow distinguishes those gaps rather than silently filling them. Threats identified by the model are risk hypotheses, not confirmed vulnerabilities, and require downstream review or testing where verification is necessary.

    Part of JetFerrari Security Engineering.

    The quality of the threat model depends on the architecture, data flows, assets, trust boundaries, and project context available to the agent. Missing information remains UNKNOWN, INFERRED, or otherwise qualified rather than being silently promoted to fact. Threats are risk hypotheses and do not prove that a vulnerability exists. Owners, existing controls, and production architecture cannot be established without supporting evidence.

    How to use

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      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

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    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

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    Security scan

    Security scan passed 23 days ago

    • Free with an Agensi account

    Permissions

    Terminal / Shell
    Read Files

    Access is limited to architecture documents, source code, configuration, and project context relevant to building the system model. The skill may use local read only inspection commands. It does not modify project files, access production systems, retrieve credentials, or perform active security testing.

    Listed23 days ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    It creates an evidence backed security model before teams jump into implementation or testing, identifying assets, actors, trust boundaries, data flows, abuse cases, and prioritized threats using STRIDE.

    Use it when designing a new application, service, feature, integration, or architecture, or when an existing system needs a structured security model before requirements, review, or testing.

    The workflow preserves the gap explicitly. It does not silently invent gateways, databases, OAuth flows, multi tenancy, queues, cloud infrastructure, existing controls, or owners just to make the threat model look complete.

    No. A threat identifies a plausible security risk given the available system model. Confirmation of an implementation vulnerability requires the appropriate downstream review, security test, vulnerability assessment, or exploit validation workflow.

    Convert applicable threats into testable security requirements, route implementation surfaces to the appropriate security reviews, and later verify the resulting controls with focused security testing.

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