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    Sudoers Check

    1

    /bin/cat /var/log/* also lets a user read /var/log/../../etc/shadow, and Defaults env_keep += "LD_PRELOAD" turns any command a user may run into root code execution.

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    Sudoers Check

    Sudoers Check

    Example session with this skill installed

    Check this project with sudoers-check.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the sudoers check

    $ python3 scripts/check_sudoers.py examples/risky
    BLOCK etc/sudoers:6 U05 UNSAFE_ENVIRONMENT_PASSED
    Defaults env_keep += "LD_PRELOAD PYTHONPATH" (keeps LD_PRELOAD, PYTHONPATH)
    Why: env_keep passes LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, PYTHONPATH or a similar variable to commands run as root, or the SETENV tag or Defaults setenv lets the user set any variable. A user allowed even one command can then load their own library or module into it (LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/x.so sudo /usr/bin/anything) and run code as root. With env_reset on, env_keep overrides sudo's built-in list of unsafe variables.
    Safer: Remove those names from env_keep and drop SETENV and setenv. If a program needs a setting, set it inside a root-owned wrapper script. Keeping harmless variables such as LANG, TZ or SSH_AUTH_SOCK is fine.

    BLOCK etc/sudoers.d/90-cloud-init-users:4 U01 NOPASSWD_ALL
    BLOCK etc/sudoers.d/deploy:2 U02 NOPASSWD_SHELL_ESCAPE
    BLOCK etc/sudoers.d/deploy:3 U04 COMMAND_IN_USER_WRITABLE_FOLDER
    BLOCK etc/sudoers.d/deploy:4 U05 UNSAFE_ENVIRONMENT_PASSED
    BLOCK etc/sudoers.d/helpdesk:2 U03 WILDCARD_IN_COMMAND
    REVIEW etc/sudoers U13 SECURE_PATH_MISSING_OR_UNSAFE
    REVIEW etc/sudoers:5 U12 ENV_RESET_OFF
    REVIEW etc/sudoers:8 U14 LONG_PASSWORD_CACHE
    REVIEW etc/sudoers:9 U11 AUTHENTICATION_TURNED_OFF
    REVIEW etc/sudoers.d/helpdesk:2 U16 SHELL_ESCAPE_WITH_PASSWORD
    REVIEW etc/sudoers.d/helpdesk:3 U17 COMMAND_SUBTRACTED_FROM_ALL
    REVIEW etc/sudoers.d/helpdesk:6 U15 RULE_FOR_ALL_USERS

    (Each finding also has Why and Safer lines, as in the first one.)
    Verdict: BLOCK. Checked 4 files, 4 with sudoers content.
    This is a static check of file text. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    A drop-in like deploy ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/vim /etc/nginx/nginx.conf looks limited, but :!sh inside vim is a root shell with no password. /bin/cat /var/log/* also lets a user read /var/log/../../etc/shadow, and Defaults env_keep += "LD_PRELOAD" turns any command a user may run into root code execution. This skill finds those and other sudoers mistakes before the rules are installed, and tells you how to fix each one.

    Your agent runs a scanner on your sudo rules: /etc/sudoers, every file in sudoers.d, sudoers templates (sudoers.j2 and similar) and files such as sudoers_deploy in Ansible roles or image builds. It reads them the way sudo does: comments and #uid user IDs, backslash line continuations, User, Runas, Host and Cmnd aliases (also across files), Defaults bound to users, hosts or commands, NOPASSWD and other tags that carry over to later commands, "" for no arguments and ^...$ regular expressions. Rules that only root gets and commands run as a user other than root are not flagged for root access, and the default sudoers files of Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora, RHEL, Arch Linux, openSUSE and macOS give NOT FLAGGED. It never runs sudo or visudo. It returns BLOCK, REVIEW, or NOT FLAGGED, with the file, line, reason, and a safer approach. Secrets are never printed.

    What it checks

    BLOCK

    • U01: NOPASSWD: ALL (directly, through a Cmnd_Alias or carried over from an earlier command), or ALL with the password turned off by Defaults !authenticate
    • U02: commands allowed without a password that open a root shell or write any file: editors, pagers, man and git with any arguments; crontab -e, systemctl edit and kubectl edit; shells, interpreters, find, tar, rsync, docker, kubectl, systemctl, cp, tee and package managers with open or wildcard arguments; interactive shells and su to root
    • U03: wildcards in command arguments, regular expressions with ., paths such as /usr/bin/ and folders ending in /
    • U04: commands, scripts or installer files (pip install -r, dpkg -i) in home folders, /tmp, /var/tmp or /dev/shm
    • U05: env_keep with LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, PYTHONPATH, PERL5LIB, NODE_OPTIONS and similar variables; the SETENV tag; Defaults setenv

    REVIEW

    • U11: Defaults !authenticate
    • U12: Defaults !env_reset
    • U13: secure_path missing (while users get limited command rules), turned off, or listing a user-writable folder or "."
    • U14: timestamp_timeout above 15 minutes or negative, timestamp_type=global, !tty_tickets
    • U15: rules for ALL users or for %users and %everyone (not when Defaults targetpw, rootpw or runaspw asks for the target's password)
    • U16: the same shell-escape commands as U02 when a password is asked
    • U17: commands subtracted from ALL (ALL, !/bin/su)

    What's included

    • The scanner (Python 3.9+, standard library only)
    • A rules guide with the reason and safer approach for each rule
    • A risky and a safe example /etc (sudoers, a cloud-init drop-in, deploy and helpdesk rules), and the real report the scanner produces on the risky one

    Limits It reads rule text: host restrictions, group membership, #include files outside the scanned folder, file ownership and the installed sudo version are not checked, and template logic (Jinja, ERB) is skipped. Rules written inside other files (Ansible lineinfile, cloud-init sudo: keys, LDAP sudoRole entries) are not read. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    Static check of sudoers text (sudoers, sudoers.d files and templates). Host and group membership, file ownership, the sudo version and the live system are not checked. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

      Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.

    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before any payment.

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    Fresh listing

    Recently published to Agensi

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    Trust & safety

    Security scan

    Security scan passed 5 days ago

    Permissions

    Terminal / Shell
    Read Files

    Runs one local Python script in the terminal. It reads your project's files, writes nothing, and makes no network calls. The example sudoers files are inert samples. They are never installed, and the scanner never runs sudo or visudo.

    Listed5 days ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    No. The script reads local files only and makes no network calls.

    No. It only reports. Your agent changes files only if you ask it to.

    Any agent that supports SKILL.md skills and can run a terminal command, such as Claude Code. It needs Python 3.9 or newer and nothing else.

    No. It reads sudoers files you point it at as text. It never runs sudo or visudo; copy the files somewhere readable if they are root-only.

    BLOCK: fix it before you ship. REVIEW: check it before release. NOT FLAGGED: no rule matched. It is a static check, so NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

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