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Srednoff Secure File Upload & Signed URL Auditor
Review upload acceptance, object authority and publish-after-validation boundaries with an evidence ledger and safe retest design; no malware scanner or storage enforcement engine is included.
$7.99
Srednoff Secure File Upload & Signed URL Auditor
Example session with this skill installed
Audit our sanitized direct-upload signing and finalize handlers for key ownership and overwrite races.
- Read your context and instructions
- Compiled the srednoff secure file
Expected report shape, not a completed real audit: Executive Summary; Scope; Evidence Reviewed
Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.
About this skill
Srednoff Secure File Upload & Signed URL Auditor
One-Line Outcome
Review upload acceptance, object authority and publish-after-validation boundaries with an evidence ledger and safe retest design; no malware scanner or storage enforcement engine is included.
Short Description
Client validation and a short-lived signed URL can hide arbitrary-key signing, unsafe parser exposure and a race between scanning one object version and serving another.
Problem It Solves
Client validation and a short-lived signed URL can hide arbitrary-key signing, unsafe parser exposure and a race between scanning one object version and serving another.
Storage API owner: upload-to-object access map, MIME/name/size validation findings and signed URL scope/expiry/reuse acceptance matrix.
What You Get
- Executive Summary
- Scope
- Evidence Reviewed
- Upload Stage And Authority Ledger
- Signed Capability Contract
- Validation And Publication Matrix
- Findings
- Prioritized Action Plan
- Quick Wins
- High-Risk Items
- Missing Evidence
- Unknowns
- Next Validation Steps
- Rollback And Backlog Risks
How It Works
- Pin the review revision and write permission boundary. Inventory upload initiation, direct transfer, multipart completion, validation, transformation, publication and download as different operations and authorities.
- Define accepted content and sensitive-data classes. Map extension, declared MIME, byte signature and safe parse results as independent signals; none alone proves a file harmless. Treat filenames and metadata as untrusted display data.
- Review application-generated object IDs and namespace ownership. Check signing, finalize and read authorization independently; do not allow the client to choose another tenant's existing key, destination path or published variant.
- Inspect actual byte, count and concurrency controls at ingress and after direct transfer. For each presigned PUT, POST policy or multipart mechanism verify provider-specific enforceable conditions rather than assuming a JSON size claim or signed Content-Type limits all uploads.
- Trace signed capability issuance: verified principal, exact bucket/key, method, required headers, validity and signing authority. Model URLs as bearer capabilities, redact query signatures and distinguish reusable provider links from application one-use tickets.
- Review overwrite and scan-to-serve races. Bind inspection and publication to the same immutable object version or verified digest, and ensure a later replacement cannot inherit an earlier clean verdict.
- Inspect quarantine isolation, malware/content-disarm policy, parser privileges and egress, resource/time limits and failures. Scanner timeout, unsupported encrypted content or missing verdict must not silently become approved content.
- Review transforms and archives only as upload consumers: decoded pixel/page/decompressed budgets, safe temporary names and non-executable output. Escalate detailed archive extraction or parser exploit analysis to its dedicated workflow; do not generate weaponized samples.
- Review serving authority and browser behavior: private read gate, public caching assumptions, disposition/content type, active content and distinct serving origin where needed. Public intended media and private documents have different policies.
- Trace quota reservation, finalize idempotency, resumable/multipart abandonment and cleanup ownership. Prevent repeated signing or concurrent finalization from bypassing the intended per-user budget; no billable cleanup is executed.
- Create harmless synthetic acceptance/rejection, cross-tenant, stale-verdict, expiry and parser-unavailable fixtures. If running any test is out of scope, mark NOT_EXECUTED and specify a local harness plan instead of uploading to a live bucket.
- Deliver stage-level findings, remediation proposals and a retest ledger. For proposed enforcement changes include existing-client compatibility, quarantine backlog, retained-object handling and a rollback that does not publish unverified bytes.
Best For
Application and storage owners accepting customer documents, media and direct-to-object-store uploads
Example Tasks
- Audit our sanitized direct-upload signing and finalize handlers for key ownership and overwrite races.
- Review quarantine release when a document scanner times out or an object changes after scanning.
- Build a harmless local signed-URL and parser-boundary retest plan without using a real bucket.
Inputs
- Authorized source revision and sanitized upload/sign/finalize/download handlers with exact storage provider and SDK versions
- Accepted file classes, limits, object-key ownership model and private/public distribution requirements
- Redacted signer policy shape, signed method/headers/expiry contract and relevant storage/CDN configuration; no signed URLs or credentials
- Quarantine, parser and scanner state transitions, object version/digest metadata and synthetic test traces
Outputs
- Executive Summary
- Scope
- Evidence Reviewed
- Upload Stage And Authority Ledger
- Signed Capability Contract
- Validation And Publication Matrix
- Findings
- Prioritized Action Plan
- Quick Wins
- High-Risk Items
- Missing Evidence
- Unknowns
- Next Validation Steps
- Rollback And Backlog Risks
Permissions
Read-only review of owner-supplied artifacts by default. Report file writes, shell/local fixture execution and official documentation lookup are optional, require available tools and their explicit scope. No live credentials are requested.
Compatibility
Standalone workflow, no Srednoff OS dependency. Codex evidence is synthetic entrypoint text only when recorded below. Claude Code, Cursor and actual buyer-runtime task delivery remain UNTESTED. Provider/platform-specific contracts must be refreshed for the installed version.
Limitations
This is an instruction/evidence workflow, not a hosted security service, persistent enforcement engine, production certification or business guarantee. The optional Python helper checks supplied claims, not underlying source artifacts. Agensi delivery is agent-only: do not save/export proprietary skill files to run local helpers; disclose NOT_EXECUTED where execution is unavailable.
Validation Transparency
Offline evidence-precheck status: PASS. Authored synthetic text-response cases: 18/18, status PASS. This is not independent security testing, complete artifact inspection or proof of deployment safety. Exact-text hashes and attempts are retained separately.
License And Publisher
Commercial License 1.0 covers original new expression; historical MIT and third-party rights remain unchanged. Mandatory marketplace conditions prevail. Publisher: Ivan Srednoff / Srednoff.Agency. No proprietary source resale or off-platform paid upsell is included.
FAQ
What is different from a generic security request? Storage API owner: upload-to-object access map, MIME/name/size validation findings and signed URL scope/expiry/reuse acceptance matrix. No archive extraction-engine review, Firebase Rules-wide audit, actual malware scanning or storage configuration changes.
Does it change production automatically? No. Audit/design is the default; changes, secret rotation, IAM, network probes and financial actions need separate explicit authorization.
Are the examples real incidents? No. They are synthetic DEMO DATA.
Is this a certification or guaranteed protection? No. Evidence gaps, residual risk and unexecuted tests remain explicit.
Can I use project-specific reports for clients? Yes under the included license; proprietary workflow source is not a client deliverable.
Version
1.0.0
Release Notes
Initial scoped security workflow with domain decision rules, evidence requirements, synthetic examples, regression cases and explicit authorization/runtime limits. No production/customer outcome is claimed.
This is an instruction/evidence workflow, not a hosted security service, persistent enforcement engine, production certification or business guarantee. The optional Python helper checks supplied claims, not underlying source artifacts. Agensi delivery is agent-only: do not save/export proprietary skill files to run local helpers; disclose NOT_EXECUTED where execution is unavailable.
How to use
- 1
Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP
Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup
- 2
Sign in to Agensi
Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.
- 3
Ask for what you need
Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before any payment.
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