Works with the AI Agents you already use
MCP Connector Builder
Builds a Streamable HTTP MCP server, hardens the host, guards SSRF on user-supplied URLs, and verifies it with two independent clients.
$21
MCP Connector Builder
Example session with this skill installed
Build me an MCP server that exposes our internal pricing table read-only, and show me how to add it as a remote connector in Claude.
- Read your context and instructions
- Compiled the mcp connector builder
Transport: Streamable HTTP on 127.0.0.1:8811 behind nginx. Skeleton with mcp<2 pinned, one read-only tool, per-IP 30/min plus 20/min per tool. Two-client check: probe_connector.py reports 1 tool, Inspector lists the same tool.
Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.
About this skill
Builds an MCP server that other people's agents can actually use — and states plainly which part of "it works" was proven.
What is inside
- Transport decision + server skeleton. stdio vs Streamable HTTP, and a FastMCP skeleton with the
SDK pin that matters (version 1.x — the 2.x line renamed
FastMCP, so an unpinned install breaks every sample),stateless_http,json_response, a small request-body cap, loopback binding, andallowed_hoststhat matches what nginx forwards. - Tool rules for a connector a third party can add. Read-only, no keys held by the connector, one config file for every changeable value, return data instead of instructions, honest tool names, call counts logged instead of payloads, and no "call any URL with any headers" passthrough.
- Abuse controls before the first request. Per-IP limit in ASGI middleware (tools cannot see the
caller's IP), per-tool sliding windows, a global hourly cap on outbound tools, and a kill switch that
is a file checked by both the middleware and every tool. Plus the nginx
limit_req_zonedetail that trips everyone up: it must live in thehttpcontext, not inside a server block. - A fail-closed SSRF guard, standard library only, for any tool that fetches a URL a user handed
it: scheme and port allowlist, every resolved address validated, the smart IP forms most filters miss
(
2130706433,0x7f000001,127.1,0177.0.0.1), cloud metadata endpoints, pinning the validated resolution for that one request, and no redirects. Includes a 20-case offline self-test and the bypass list it must catch. - Hosting. A hardened systemd unit (dedicated user,
ProtectHome,ProtectSystem=strict, empty capability set, memory/CPU caps), the nginx location block, and thensentercommand that proves the service cannot see your home directory, keys or session database. - Verification protocol. A stdlib wire-protocol probe (
initialize→notifications/initialized→tools/list→tools/call) that needs no SDK and no Node.js, MCP Inspector as a genuinely independent second client, the security matrix to run (SSRF cases, redirect, DNS rebinding with a control case, oversized body, malformed input, rate-limit rain), and the four-layer check for publishing to an MCP registry.
What it will not do. It will not host the service for you — opening a public route (nginx, DNS, firewall, TLS) is an operator action and the skill deliberately stops at the loopback service. It will not make a badly designed upstream API safe. It does not store credentials; a public connector built with it should hold none. A clean test run means the listed cases passed, not that the endpoint is secure.
Tested before publishing. ssrf_guard.py --selftest passes 20/20 offline cases including the
control case (which is what caught a real bypass in the first draft of the guard: the POSIX short form
127.1). The probe completed a real handshake against a live remote MCP server — initialize, then 27
tools listed — and the guard completed a real pinned HTTPS fetch of a public page while refusing both a
loopback target and a cloud-metadata target.
It does not host anything for you: opening the public route (nginx, DNS, firewall, TLS) stays an operator action. It does not make a badly designed upstream API safe, and it stores no credentials — a public connector built with it should hold none. Passing self-tests means the listed cases passed, not that an endpoint is secure.
How to use
- 1
Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP
Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup
- 2
Sign in to Agensi
Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.
- 3
Ask for what you need
Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before any payment.
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Security scan
Security scan passed 6 days ago
Requires
Permissions
File Scopes
Network use is limited to what you point it at: one HTTPS request per probe to the MCP endpoint you name, plus one request to any URL you pass to the guard's fetch. No credentials are stored, read or forwarded.