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    Identity Federation: SAML, OIDC, OAuth2 Review

    1

    Audit SSO the way attackers map it: draw the full SP–IdP trust chain, test SAML assertion integrity, OIDC flow checks, and the session layer, and verify every finding by reproduction.

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    Identity Federation: SAML, OIDC, OAuth2 Review

    Identity Federation: SAML, OIDC, OAuth2 Review

    Example session with this skill installed

    We sell to enterprises and offer SAML SSO plus OIDC for smaller customers. A customer's security team is about to pen-test our login. Can you audit our federation setup first, the way an attacker would map it?

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the identity federation

    Step 1, the chain: user → your SP (login initiated) → IdP (authenticates) → SAML assertion → your SP (validates, creates session). Trust assumptions written on each arrow; the unstated one — "the SP probably verifies the assertion itself" — became the first test target.

    Step 2, captures: full proxy-captured logins for a standard user and a tenant admin in your test tenant, saved as baselines. Every mutation below is a diff against these.

    Step 3, link tests. SAML integrity: the response wrapper is signed, but replaying the flow with the assertion's signature element removed still creates a session. Escalating only inside the test tenant: the assertion's NameID is changed to the tenant admin test account — unsigned — and the SP creates an admin session. Assertion-level signature verification is not enforced. Audience and expiry checks, by contrast, hold: a cross-SP assertion and an expired one are both rejected, recorded as negative evidence.

    OIDC side: redirect_uri is exact-match, state and nonce are enforced, codes are single-use with PKCE on the public client — cleared with captures. Session layer: SP logout leaves the IdP session alive, so a "logged out" user is silently re-authenticated on the next login attempt.

    Step 4, verdicts: unsigned-assertion acceptance rated Critical (reachable by anyone who can reach the login endpoint; fix = reject assertions lacking a valid assertion-level signature before session creation, plus a regression test replaying this capture). Orphaned IdP session on logout rated Low with the capture attached.

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    Single sign-on breaks at the links, not the endpoints — an assertion the SP never really verified, a redirect_uri matched by prefix, a logout that leaves the IdP session alive. This skill is the audit routine for the federation layer. It starts by drawing the complete trust chain (user → SP → IdP → token → SP session) with the trust assumption written on every arrow, then captures a real login per role as the lab every test replays and mutates. The checks cover the classic link failures: SAML signature coverage (assertion vs. response wrapper), algorithm downgrade, audience/recipient mismatch, and replay windows; OIDC/OAuth2 redirect_uri strictness, state and nonce enforcement, PKCE, code single-use, and multi-tenant issuer confusion; plus the session layer — logout completeness in both directions, session fixation, and claim-to-role mapping. Nothing is reported on theory: every finding carries the exact mutated request, the response proving the bypass, an impact statement, and a rating from a trigger-requirement table. Includes a finding template and the full usual-suspects checklist.

    • Encrypted assertions can't be mutated without a test configuration; the skill records those checks as blocked rather than passed when the IdP admin can't provide one.
    • Some IdP tenant settings (Okta, Entra ID, ADFS) need the IdP admin's cooperation to verify — the audit flags exactly which items need their eyes.
    • It covers the federation layer only; JWT/API-token issues on non-federated APIs belong to API security testing.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

      Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.

    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before any payment.

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    Security scan passed 24 days ago

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    Listed24 days ago
    Updated21 days ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Written scope covering the SP, the IdP, and the test accounts, plus test users at every privilege level you'll test — standard user and admin at minimum. Mid-assessment account requests stall the work, so the skill insists on them up front.

    It isn't reported as one. Every finding needs the mutated request, the response proving the bypass, and an impact statement. Anything short of that is listed as a hypothesis with what would be needed to verify it safely.

    No — it tests the protocol links between SP and IdP, not credentials. No spraying, no brute force, no credential attacks of any kind. Credential and MFA policy review is a different engagement.

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