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    GitHub Actions Poisoning Detector

    1

    Detect and remediate GitHub Actions vulnerabilities including PR Target poisoning and command injection risks.

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    Security scanned
    GitHub Actions Poisoning Detector

    GitHub Actions Poisoning Detector

    Example session with this skill installed

    Audit my .github/workflows/ci.yml file for pull_request_target poisoning and command injection risks.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the github actions poisoning

    I have analyzed .github/workflows/ci.yml for execution hijacking and runner compromise vectors. I found two high-risk vulnerabilities related to untrusted code execution and unescaped expressions.

    GitHub Actions Security Audit: ci.yml

    Risk TypeLocationTrigger/ExpressionSeverityRecommendation
    PR Target PoisoningLine 12pull_request_targetCriticalUse a two-step workflow with workflow_run.
    Command InjectionLine 45${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}HighMap to an environment variable instead of inline script.
    Privileged CheckoutLine 15actions/checkout with refHighDo not checkout untrusted code with write-access tokens.

    Remediation: Safe Two-Step Architecture

    
    # Recommended separation of build and upload
    name: Secure PR Workflow
    on:
      pull_request:
        branches: [main]
    jobs:
      build:
        runs-on: ubuntu-latest
        steps:
          - uses: actions/checkout@v4
          - name: Build untrusted code
            run: npm ci && npm run build
          - name: Upload artifact
            uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
            with:
              name: build-output
              path: dist/
    

    Next steps

    1. Move privileged deployment steps to a separate workflow triggered by workflow_run.
    2. Replace all inline ${{ github.event... }} expressions in run steps with intermediate environment variables.
    3. Restrict permissions at the job level to contents: read by default.

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    GitHub Actions workflows often hide critical security flaws that allow attackers to hijack runners and steal repository secrets. This skill audits your CI/CD configurations for high-risk patterns like Pull Request Target poisoning and command injection in environment variables.

    What it does

    • Event Trigger Analysis scans for risky triggers including pull_request_target, issue_comment, and workflow_run.
    • Checkout Detection identifies instances where untrusted fork code is checked out alongside privileged tokens.
    • Expression Auditing flags unescaped ${{ github.event.* }} expressions in run steps that lead to command injection.
    • Remediation Generation produces safe two-step workflow architectures to isolate untrusted builds from privileged deployments.

    How it works

    1. Point the agent to your .github/workflows/ directory for a static analysis of YAML configurations.
    2. The agent identifies execution hijacking vectors based on event context and token permissions.
    3. Review the vulnerability report detailing specific line-item risks and exploitation paths.
    4. Apply the suggested architectural fixes to separate privileged tasks from untrusted code execution.

    Frameworks & tools

    This skill works directly with GitHub Actions YAML syntax and standard DevSecOps security patterns for CI/CD pipelines.

    Why this beats prompting it yourself

    Generic prompts often miss the subtle interaction between pull_request_target permissions and code checkouts. This skill uses a deterministic workflow to ensure every known injection vector is checked against industry-standard pwn-request patterns.

    Use cases

    • Audit existing CI pipelines for secrets exfiltration risks.
    • Review new workflow PRs for environment variable injection.
    • Refactor single-stage privileged workflows into safe two-step architectures.
    • Harden repository runners against unauthorized execution from forks.

    Known limitations

    Analysis is restricted to static YAML files within the workspace. It does not perform dynamic analysis or external network calls to verify live runner states.

    Restricted to static analysis of YAML files in the local workspace. No external network calls or live runner verification.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

      Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.

    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before any payment.

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    Fresh listing

    Recently published to Agensi

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    Trust & safety

    Security scan

    Security scan passed 4 days ago

    Requires

    File System Read/Write (strictly scoped to current project workspace `./`). Zero global installation or elevated privileges required.

    Permissions

    Read Files
    Write Files

    Target Use Cases: - Check my github action workflows for pull_request_target poisoning. - Audit CI/CD for command injection in github expressions. - Detect pwn-request vulnerabilities in repository pipelines.

    Listed4 days ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    The detector identifies critical vulnerabilities like 'pull_request_target' poisoning and command injection in environment variables, which often lead to secret exfiltration and runner hijacking. It solves the risk of allowing untrusted code from forks to execute with privileged repository access.

    No, this skill performs static analysis on your YAML configuration files within your workspace. It does not require live access to your repository or runners, ensuring your active production environments remain untouched during the audit.

    The skill provides a detailed vulnerability report with specific line-item risks and, more importantly, generates safe two-step workflow architectures to replace insecure configurations. This allows you to isolate untrusted builds from privileged deployments effectively.

    Yes, the skill is designed to work with any AI agent that has access to your local or repository file system. Simply point the agent to your '.github/workflows/' directory to begin the automated security scan.

    Standard LLM prompts often overlook the subtle interplay between event contexts and token permissions. This skill uses a deterministic security framework to ensure every known injection vector is systematically checked against industry-standard 'pwn-request' patterns.

    New in DevOps & Cloud