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    Cloud and Kubernetes Security Assessment

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    Assess cloud, container, and Kubernetes security on authorized targets: start from identity, map what is exposed, trace blast radius, and report the top three findings with fixes and evidence.

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    Cloud and Kubernetes Security Assessment

    Cloud and Kubernetes Security Assessment

    Example session with this skill installed

    Assess our staging cluster and the payments namespace. Read-only, no production touch. What are the worst findings?

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the cloud and kubernetes

    IDENTITY: The workload service account in payments is bound to a cluster-scoped admin role — the gap between what the SA was meant for (deploying to one namespace) and what the bindings allow (everything) is the first finding. A second identity, the CI deploy bot, can assume a cloud role with pass-role permission plus compute rights.

    EXPOSURE: One storage bucket is publicly readable and holds database backups. The metadata endpoint is reachable from workloads at version one. The API server is correctly restricted.

    BLAST RADIUS: The cluster-admin binding is total: any pod escape in payments becomes total cluster compromise. The pass-role chain is wide: the deploy bot can pick its own permissions. The public bucket is wide: backups are downloadable by anyone. The metadata endpoint is local-to-wide depending on what the workload's role can reach.

    ESCAPE PATHS: Two workloads run privileged (deployable by anyone with deploy rights — missing admission controls), one mounts the container runtime socket read-write.

    REPORT — TOP THREE BY BLAST RADIUS: (1) Cluster-admin binding on the workload SA — fix: replace with a namespace-scoped role allowing deploy and read in payments only. (2) Privileged workloads plus missing admission controls — fix: deny privileged pods at admission, remove the runtime-socket mount. (3) Publicly readable backup bucket — fix: remove public access, scope the bucket policy to the backup role. Each carries the exact resource, the attack path in plain steps, and the command output that proves it.

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    About this skill

    Cloud breaches are identity breaches wearing an infrastructure costume — nearly every finding traces back to who an identity is, what it can reach, and what falls if it is compromised. This skill starts there, not with a port scan. Step zero is authorization: written scope naming the accounts, clusters, and namespaces, and rules that forbid destructive actions, data exfiltration, and unapproved production touch. Ambiguity is not authorization.

    Then it establishes identity (cloud principals and role-assumption chains, Kubernetes service accounts and their bindings, container users and capabilities), maps the exposed surface (storage, network, metadata services, API exposure), and traces blast radius per finding — graded total, wide, local, or minimal, because a medium misconfiguration that leads to cluster admin outranks a high CVE on an isolated workload. Container escape paths are checked in likelihood order: privileged containers, host-path mounts, dangerous capabilities, kernel exposure. Every finding carries the exact resource, the attack path in plain steps, the blast radius, a specific fix (never "apply least privilege"), and command output as evidence. The report leads with the top three by blast radius. A worked example assesses a staging cluster and its payments namespace, finding a cluster-admin workload SA, privileged pods, and a public backup bucket.

    • Without written authorization naming the accounts, clusters, and namespaces, the assessment does not start.
    • Some findings need a write to prove; when the rules forbid it, the finding is reported as capability-confirmed by API query, exploit not executed per scope.
    • A finding with no clean fix is reported with its blast radius and compensating control, not hidden.
    • Checklist severity never outranks blast radius in the report ordering.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

      Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.

    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before any payment.

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    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Because nearly every cloud finding traces back to identity: who this principal is, what it can reach, and what falls if it is compromised. A port scan finds exposure; identity tells you what the exposure is worth to an attacker.

    Context grades it. Open access to a load balancer's HTTPS port is routine; the same rule to a database port or the metadata endpoint is a finding. The grade follows what the exposure reaches, not how it looks on a checklist.

    The three with the largest blast radius, which lead the report. Nobody fixes a forty-item list; everybody reads the top three. A medium misconfiguration that leads to cluster admin outranks a high CVE on an isolated workload.

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