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- Argo CD Config Check
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Argo CD Config Check
Check Argo CD config before you apply it: committed repository passwords and SSO secrets, anonymous access, admin as the default role, auth turned off, http repositories, wide-open AppProjects and risky sync settings.
$5
Argo CD Config Check
Example session with this skill installed
Check this project with argocd-config-check.
- Read your context and instructions
- Compiled the argo cd config
$ python3 scripts/check_argocd.py examples/risky
BLOCK apps/shop-prod.yaml:18 A01 SECRET_IN_ARGOCD_CONFIG
value: <redacted>
Why: A password, token, private key or client secret is written in an Argo CD file: a repository, credential-template or cluster Secret, argocd-secret, an SSO clientSecret in argocd-cm, a notifications token, the argo-cd Helm values, Helm parameters or values inside an Application, or a password in a repository URL. Everyone who can read the Git repository can use it, and values inside an Application are also shown to every Argo CD user who can view that Application.
Safer: Rotate the credential, then keep it out of Git: create the Secret from a secret manager (External Secrets Operator, Sealed Secrets, SOPS) or with argocd repo add, reference SSO and notification secrets as $key or $secret-name:key, and give Helm charts an existingSecret instead of a password value.
BLOCK argocd/argocd-cm.yaml:12 A02 ANONYMOUS_ACCESS
BLOCK argocd/argocd-cm.yaml:18 A01 SECRET_IN_ARGOCD_CONFIG
BLOCK argocd/argocd-cmd-params-cm.yaml:10 A04 AUTH_DISABLED
BLOCK argocd/argocd-rbac-cm.yaml:7 A03 DEFAULT_ROLE_ADMIN
BLOCK argocd/repositories.yaml:11 A05 PLAIN_HTTP_REPOSITORY
BLOCK argocd/repositories.yaml:13 A01 SECRET_IN_ARGOCD_CONFIG
REVIEW apps/shop-prod.yaml:10 A13 FLOATING_REVISION_IN_PRODUCTION
REVIEW apps/shop-prod.yaml:26 A14 PRUNE_ALLOW_EMPTY
REVIEW appsets/tenants.yaml:20 A18 TEMPLATED_PROJECT_FROM_REPO_DATA
REVIEW argocd/argocd-cm.yaml:13 A16 WEB_TERMINAL_ENABLED
REVIEW argocd/argocd-cm.yaml:14 A17 LOCAL_ADMIN_ACCOUNT
REVIEW argocd/argocd-cmd-params-cm.yaml:8 A15 TLS_OFF
REVIEW argocd/repositories.yaml:14 A15 TLS_OFF
REVIEW projects/platform.yaml:11 A11 PROJECT_DESTINATIONS_TOO_WIDE
REVIEW projects/platform.yaml:14 A12 ALL_CLUSTER_RESOURCES_ALLOWED
(Each finding also has Why and Safer lines, as in the first one.)
Verdict: BLOCK. Checked 9 files, 8 with Argo CD content.
This is a static check of file text. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.
About this skill
policy.default: role:admin in argocd-rbac-cm makes every account in your SSO directory an Argo CD admin, and a deny rule cannot take that back. A repository Secret with its password under stringData is readable by everyone who can read the Git repository. An ApplicationSet that takes its project from a tenant's config.json lets that tenant move its Applications into the platform project. This skill finds those and the other Argo CD mistakes below, and tells you how to fix each one.
Your agent runs a scanner on the YAML files of your GitOps repository: Application, ApplicationSet and AppProject manifests, argocd-cm, argocd-rbac-cm and argocd-cmd-params-cm (also as kustomize patches and configMapGenerator literals), argocd-secret, Notifications config, repository, credential-template and cluster Secrets, the argocd-server Service and Deployment, and values files of the argo-cd and argocd-apps Helm charts. It reads the YAML inside oidc.config and dex.config, Helm values blocks and cluster config JSON with their own line numbers, treats $key, $secret:key, ${VAR}, vault-plugin path placeholders and SOPS ENC values as references kept outside the file, checks the argo-cd chart's values.yaml even when its comments hold Helm template examples, and skips Helm chart templates and documents that have nothing to do with Argo CD. It never contacts a cluster, Argo CD or a Git server and never uses the network. It returns BLOCK, REVIEW, or NOT FLAGGED, with the file, line, reason, and a safer approach. Secrets are never printed.
What it checks
BLOCK
- A01: passwords, tokens, private keys and client secrets written in Argo CD files (repository, credential-template and cluster Secrets, argocd-secret, SSO clientSecret or bindPW in argocd-cm, notification tokens, argo-cd Helm values, Helm parameters, values and plugin env inside an Application, a password in a repository URL)
- A02: anonymous access (users.anonymous.enabled: "true")
- A03: policy.default: role:admin
- A04: authentication turned off (server.disable.auth or --disable-auth)
- A05: repositories reached over http:// or git:// on a public host (a public IP or a public domain; in-cluster names such as gitea-http.gitea and private addresses are not reported)
REVIEW
- A11: AppProjects that can deploy to any namespace on any cluster or on Argo CD's own cluster, or accept Applications from every namespace
- A12: AppProjects that allow every cluster-scoped kind (clusterResourceWhitelist group '', kind '')
- A13: production Applications (pre-prod and non-prod do not count) that track HEAD, a branch, no targetRevision, a semver range on Git tags, or a Helm chart version range
- A14: automated sync with prune and allowEmpty
- A15: TLS turned off: insecure repositories or clusters, internal TLS off, TLS 1.0 or 1.1, or server.insecure while a LoadBalancer, or a NodePort without a TLS ingress in front, exposes argocd-server directly
- A16: the web terminal turned on (exec.enabled)
- A17: the local admin left on next to SSO, or the admin password hash committed
- A18: ApplicationSets whose project comes from Git, SCM provider, pull request or plugin generator data
What's included
- The scanner (Python 3.9+, standard library only)
- A rules guide with the reason, safer approach and official Argo CD documentation link for each rule
- A risky and a safe example (a self-managed Argo CD with its config maps, a repository Secret, a project, a production Application and a tenant ApplicationSet), and the real report the scanner produces on the risky one
Limits It reads each YAML file as written. Helm chart templates (files in a chart's templates/ folder or with unquoted Helm directives) are skipped; Jsonnet, JSON manifests and kustomize output are not rendered, and settings made outside the repository (the argocd CLI or UI, Secrets created by a secret operator, the live cluster) are not seen. server.insecure alone is not reported, because Argo CD's ingress docs use it behind a TLS-terminating ingress. "Production" in A13 is decided from names, so check those findings against your release process. Credentials in other Kubernetes objects are left to other checks. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
Static check of YAML text. Helm templates, Jsonnet and JSON manifests are not rendered or read, settings made in the Argo CD UI or CLI and the live cluster are not seen, and "production" in A13 is inferred from names. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
How to use
- 1
Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP
Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup
- 2
Sign in to Agensi
Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.
- 3
Ask for what you need
Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before any payment.
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Permissions
Runs one local Python script in the terminal. It reads your project's files, writes nothing, and makes no network calls. The example project includes clearly fake, inert passwords and secrets (NOTREAL ... example) for the scanner to find. Nothing in it is applied or run.