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ai Security Auditor
Your AI agent has access to 12 tools, reads from a vector database, and executes shell commands.
Free
ai-security-auditor
Example session with this skill installed
"Audit my agent configuration — it uses 5 MCP servers and scrapes web content"
- Read your context and instructions
- Compiled the ai-security-auditor
AI SECURITY AUDIT REPORT
════════════════════════
Agent: content-researcher
Overall Risk: HIGH (2 Critical, 4 High, 3 Medium)
ID Severity Category Finding Remediation
── ──────── ─────────── ──────────────────────────────────────────── ─────────────────────────────────────────
F1 CRITICAL Injection Web scraper output concatenated into context Add content delimiter tokens and strip
unsanitized instruction patterns
F2 CRITICAL Agency Terminal tool has unrestricted shell access Restrict to command allowlist (git, npm,
python)
F3 HIGH Leakage API key hardcoded in system Move to env var
prompt line 23 $AGENT_API_KEY via secret
─────── ──── ─────── ─────────────────────────── ─────────────────────────
manager
F4 HIGH Permissions MCP filesystem server has write access to / Restrict to project directory with path
allowlist
Priority actions: [1] Sanitize web output before context injection
[2] Restrict terminal to allowlist [3] Rotate and remove hardcoded key
Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.
About this skill
The Problem
Your AI agent has access to 12 tools, reads from a vector database, and executes shell commands. The system prompt was copied from a blog post. A malicious user discovers that crafted input causes the agent to dump environment variables into a public channel. You don't find out days later. Prompt injection is the #1 attack vector against AI agents — and most teams have zero defensive tooling beyond "trust the model."
What You Get
- Scan prompt templates for injection vectors — detect direct concatenation of user input into system prompts, insufficient role separation, XML/markdown tag injection, and recursive override patterns across six attack categories
- Audit tool permission boundaries — map every MCP server and tool integration to a permission matrix (read/write/execute/network) with risk-level classification from LOW to CRITICAL
- Detect data leakage paths — find hardcoded API keys in system prompts, sensitive data persisting in conversation history, context window overexposure, and tool output that returns more data than the agent needs
- Evaluate excessive agency — classify every autonomous action on an escalation ladder (READ_ONLY through FULL_EXECUTE) and flag missing human-in-the-loop gates with blast-radius analysis
- Assess RAG pipeline security — check vector database authentication, document ingestion sanitization, retrieval relevance scoring, and context assembly trust-weighting for poisoned-document attacks
- Generate structured audit findings — CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW severity with specific line references, OWASP LLM category mapping, and prioritized remediation steps that include before/after code examples
Why This Beats Prompting It Yourself
Asking an agent "is my prompt secure?" returns generic advice about role separation. But it won't trace the full data flow from a tool's untrusted output through your RAG retrieval into the LLM context, identifying that a poisoned document in your vector DB could override system instructions. This skill maps the complete attack surface across six phases with pattern-matching precision — not vibes.
Example Session
You: "Audit my agent configuration — it uses 5 MCP servers and scrapes web content"
Agent:
AI SECURITY AUDIT REPORT
════════════════════════
Agent: content-researcher
Overall Risk: HIGH (2 Critical, 4 High, 3 Medium)
ID Severity Category Finding Remediation
── ──────── ─────────── ──────────────────────────────────────────── ─────────────────────────────────────────
F1 CRITICAL Injection Web scraper output concatenated into context Add content delimiter tokens and strip
unsanitized instruction patterns
F2 CRITICAL Agency Terminal tool has unrestricted shell access Restrict to command allowlist (git, npm,
python)
F3 HIGH Leakage API key hardcoded in system Move to env var
prompt line 23 $AGENT_API_KEY via secret
─────── ──── ─────── ─────────────────────────── ─────────────────────────
manager
F4 HIGH Permissions MCP filesystem server has write access to / Restrict to project directory with path
allowlist
Priority actions: [1] Sanitize web output before context injection
[2] Restrict terminal to allowlist [3] Rotate and remove hardcoded key
Use Cases
- Pre-deployment security review of any AI agent or LLM-powered application
- Evaluating third-party MCP servers before adding them to your agent's toolset
- Post-incident forensics after a suspected injection attack on your agent
- Compliance documentation for regulated industries (finance, healthcare, government)
- Hardening agent configurations during security sprints or red-team exercises
- Training new team members on secure prompt engineering patterns with real examples
Known Limitations
This is static analysis of configuration files — it cannot detect dynamic attacks during live user interaction. Multi-agent trust boundaries and cascading permission escalation are partially covered but require manual review for complex orchestration patterns. Non-English skill files may have undetected issues since patterns are English-focused.
Upgrade Path
Free audits one agent surface in conversation against the OWASP LLM Top 10. AI Security Auditor Pro ($9.99 one-time) batch-scans a skill library, maps findings to OWASP LLM Top 10, emits SARIF for GitHub Code Scanning, and auto-generates remediation patches.
Upgrade when you maintain more than a handful of skills or need a merge-gate artifact:
This is static analysis of configuration files — it cannot detect dynamic attacks during live user interaction. Multi-agent trust boundaries and cascading permission escalation are partially covered but require manual review for complex orchestration patterns. Non-English skill files may have undetected issues since patterns are English-focused.
How to use
- 1
Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP
Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup
- 2
Sign in to Agensi
Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.
- 3
Ask for what you need
Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before any payment.
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