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    Works with the AI Agents you already use

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    AI Agent Threat Model — Prompt Injection & Tool Misuse

    1

    Map trust boundaries, trace injection-to-tool attack paths, and prioritize concrete controls before an AI agent ships.

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    AI Agent Threat Model — Prompt Injection & Tool Misuse

    AI Agent Threat Model — Prompt Injection & Tool Misuse

    Example session with this skill installed

    Threat-model our support agent. It reads customer emails and RAG results, can search the knowledge base, send emails, and issue refunds up to $500 without human approval. We have not documented vector-store write validation or customer-level retrieval scoping.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the ai agent threat

    VERDICT: NOT-DEPLOYABLE

    CRITICAL — Combined tampering + elevation path
    Untrusted email content reaches the model context while the refund tool can act without human review.

    Evidence: Stated
    Confidence: 88% — based mainly on stated autonomy and tool authority
    Priority control: require human confirmation for refunds, isolate untrusted content from instructions, and cap tool authority.

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    What it does

    An AI agent can turn untrusted text into a real action. This skill reconstructs the system as a data-flow diagram, applies STRIDE to every relevant element, and treats prompt injection plus high-impact tool access as one compound path instead of two disconnected checklist items.

    What you get

    • A deployment verdict and AI data-flow inventory.
    • Trust boundaries and a STRIDE-per-element matrix.
    • Evidence-tagged findings with confidence scores.
    • A mitigation roadmap ordered by consequence.
    • A deterministic coverage check for every applicable STRIDE category and the combined injection-to-tool path.

    Worked path included

    Send no architecture and the skill runs a labeled demonstration on its built-in customer-support agent. The package also includes a complete worked example and a universal prompt edition for capable chat models that do not load skills directly.

    Known limitations

    This is a design-stage threat model, not a penetration test or safety certification. It works from the architecture and permissions you describe, does not inspect a live system, and does not generate adversarial instruction payloads or working exploits. Classic web/API logic and cloud IAM require their own reviews.

    Works from the architecture and permissions the user describes; it does not inspect a live system. Findings tied to missing details stay marked Unknown. Covers AI, LLM, RAG, and agentic systems; classic web/API logic and cloud IAM need separate reviews. Does not produce exploit code or certify that a system is secure.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

      Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.

    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before any payment.

    Reviews

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    Fresh listing

    Recently published to Agensi

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    Trust & safety

    Security scan

    Security scan passed 3 months ago

    Permissions

    No special permissions declared or detected

    Listed3 months ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    No. It works from the architecture, tools, memory, retrieval, and permission details you provide. It does not connect to or inspect a live system.

    Security-relevant gaps stay marked Unknown instead of being assumed. The report explains which missing evidence affects each finding and confidence score.

    No. It is a structured design-stage threat model. It does not replace authorized testing, code review, or a qualified security assessment.

    The checker verifies STRIDE coverage for every data-flow element and confirms that an injection-capable context path paired with a high-impact tool receives a combined assessment.

    No. It describes attack mechanisms only at the level needed to prioritize controls. The deliverable is the mitigation plan, not an executable attack.

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