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    Agent Safety Hooks: Block Destructive Commands, Leaked Keys

    1

    A PreToolUse hook pack that checks every Bash command before your coding agent runs it and denies or asks on broad deletes, force-pushes to protected branches, history rewrites and keys in commands.

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    Agent Safety Hooks: Block Destructive Commands, Leaked Keys

    Agent Safety Hooks: Block Destructive Commands, Leaked Keys

    Example session with this skill installed

    Show me what the hook would block before I install it.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the agent safety hooks

    I ran the bundled selftest before installing anything. It feeds 63 fixture commands to the hook and compares each decision with the expected one. Nothing is executed: the hook only reads the command text. ## Selftest (excerpt) | case | expected | got | reason the agent sees | |---|---|---|---| | recursive delete of home | deny | deny | recursive delete of the home folder; name the exact folder inside the project, or ask the user to do it | | flags reordered and split | deny | deny | recursive delete of the home folder; name the exact folder inside the project, or ask the user to do it | | inside bash -c | deny | deny | recursive delete of the home folder; name the exact folder inside the project, or ask the user to do it | | force-push to main | deny | deny | force-push to protected branch main; push to a new branch and open a pull request instead | | plus refspec to main | deny | deny | force-push to protected branch main; push to a new branch and open a pull request instead | | force without branch | ask | ask | force-push without an explicit branch; the target may be protected. Name the branch, or confirm | | lease to main | ask | ask | --force-with-lease to protected branch main still rewrites shared history; confirm with the user | | reset --hard | ask | ask | git reset --hard discards uncommitted work; consider git stash or a backup branch first | | download piped to shell | ask | ask | downloaded text is piped into bash; download the script, read it, then run it | | GitHub token in a header | deny | deny | the command line contains what looks like a secret: GitHub token (40 chars). Put it in an environment variable or a file the tool reads, not in the command. | | ask earlier in the line does not hide a deny | deny | deny | recursive delete of the home folder; name the exact folder inside the project, or ask the user to do it (and 1 more finding) | | fork bomb | deny | deny | fork bomb pattern | | delete inside the project | silent | silent | (silent: normal permission flow) | | delete text in echo | silent | silent | (silent: normal permission flow) | | force-push own branch | silent | silent | (silent: normal permission flow) | | env var reference, not a value | silent | silent | (silent: normal permission flow) | **Result:** 63 of 63 cases as expected. ## The hook's answer for a force-push to main **Input:** the sample PreToolUse event for `git push --force origin main`. ```json { "hookSpecificOutput": { "hookEventName": "PreToolUse", "permissionDecision": "deny", "permissionDecisionReason": "safety-hooks: force-push to protected branch main; push to a new branch and open a pull request instead" } } ``` ## What this means - **Deny:** recursive deletes of broad folders, force-pushes and mirror pushes to protected branches, disk-wiping commands and credentials typed into a command. Claude sees the reason and can pick a safer route. - **Ask:** `git reset --hard`, `git clean -f`, a force-push without a named branch, `--force-with-lease` to a protected branch and a download piped into a shell. You confirm first. - **Silent:** everything else, such as deleting a build folder inside the project, `echo` with dangerous-looking text or force-pushing your own feature branch, goes through the normal permission flow. Want me to install it for this project? I will merge it into `.claude/settings.json` and never overwrite hooks you already have.

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    About this skill

    Use when you let an agent run shell commands and want a seatbelt that does not depend on the model remembering a rule. A standard-library Python hook, built for the hook system in Claude Code, follows its documented PreToolUse format: it denies recursive deletes of broad folders, force-pushes and mirror pushes to protected branches (configurable), disk-wiping commands and credentials typed into a command, and it asks before `git reset --hard`, `git clean -f`, a force-push without a branch, `--force-with-lease` to a protected branch, or a download piped into a shell. Every command in the line is checked and deny wins over ask. It handles the common spellings: short flags in any order, long options and their abbreviations, shell keywords such as `if` and `do`, wrappers such as `sudo`, `env` and `xargs`, paths with `..`, and `bash -c`, `eval` and command substitutions; the known misses are listed in the package. Credential reasons show a type label and length only; the hook never prints the value. It reduces risk; it does not make dangerous actions impossible: aliases, script files, `python -c`, encoded payloads and tools other than Bash are not inspected. A selftest shows the main rules firing before you install. Do not use when you want a code review, branch protection on your Git host, or hooks for tools other than Bash. ## Example prompts 1. "Add safety hooks that block force-pushes to main in this repo." 2. "Show me what the hook would block before I install it." 3. "Install the guard for all my projects and protect main, stable and release/* branches." ## Requires Claude Code with hooks (v2.1.295 or later for the fail-closed `onFailure` setting; older versions work without it), Python 3.8+ (standard library only). ## Compatibility Built for the hook system in Claude Code (the PreToolUse event on the Bash tool). It is not a general SKILL.md workflow for other agents. ## Limits Pattern-based and Bash-only. It complements protected branches on your Git host and keeping credentials out of the agent's environment; it does not replace them. ## Independence Not affiliated with or endorsed by Anthropic. Claude Code is named in plain text only to say which hook system the package is built for.

    Pattern-based and Bash-only. Aliases, script files the agent writes, python -c, encoded payloads and tools other than Bash are not inspected; the known misses are listed in references/bypasses.md. It complements protected branches on your Git host and keeping credentials out of the agent's environment; it does not replace them.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

      Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.

    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before any payment.

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    Security scan passed 26 days ago

    Requires

    Claude Code
    Python 3.8+
    Git

    Permissions

    Terminal / Shell
    Read Files
    Write Files
    Environment Variables
    Listed26 days ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    No. It reduces risk. It reads each Bash command before it runs and denies or asks on the patterns it knows. Aliases, script files, python -c, encoded payloads and tools other than Bash are not inspected, and the known misses are listed in the package.

    No. The reason shows a fixed type label and the length only, never the value or the variable name. The command itself is still in the agent's tool call and the session transcript, so a key typed there should be rotated.

    Yes. The default list is main, master, trunk, develop, production, prod, release and release/*. Set SAFETY_HOOKS_PROTECTED_BRANCHES to use your own list.

    No. Installation checks your settings file and merges the hook into it; existing PreToolUse hooks are never overwritten.

    It is built for the PreToolUse hook event on the Bash tool in Claude Code. It is not a general SKILL.md workflow for other agents.

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